

11-5-58 21st Guided Missile Meeting

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15 July 1958

Ad Hoc IAC Working Group: Operational Soviet Nuclear Delivery Vehicles in Mid-1962: Terms of Reference

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the numbers of offensive nuclear delivery vehicles of various types (ground and air-launched guided missiles, medium and heavy bombers and tankers, naval and tactical aircraft, and guided missile submarines) the USSR will have in operational use in mid-1962; these estimates to be prepared for the purpose of providing a contribution to the intelligence assumptions used by the Net Evaluation Sub-committee.

ASSUMPTIONS

For purposes of this study, it is assumed:

- that there will be no international agreement on the limitation or control of armaments during this period;
- that the USSR is not and will not during the period of this estimate be preparing for general war to begin at any particular

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date in the future (i.e. that the date 1962 has no special significance in Soviet planning);

-- that Soviet military thinking and strategy will be generally as outlined in NIE 11-4-57;

-- that Soviet requirements for offensive nuclear delivery systems will in general be related to the missions to be performed and targets to be attacked in the event of general war, and also to the strength and composition of those Soviet military components which logically would employ the various delivery systems;

-- that all Soviet programs for production and operational deployment of offensive nuclear delivery systems during this period will be governed by considerations of optimum effectiveness vs. cost of weapon systems, maximum utilization of proven military hardware, minimum loss or wastage due to obsolescence factors, and maximum efficiency in the utilization of available resources.

GUIDELINES FOR WORKING GROUP

In order to meet the 15 August deadline, it is obvious that heavy reliance will have to be placed on existing studies and

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estimates bearing on the problem of future Soviet nuclear delivery capabilities, re-examining and modifying them as necessary to provide the most reasonable assumptions that can be made at the present time. Given the use of such studies as a starting point, the most time-consuming aspect of this exercise is expected to be the scheduling and costing of production and deployment of guided missiles, which ORR estimates can be accomplished in about a week and a half. It is therefore proposed that the Working Group's initial effort be directed toward making a preliminary estimate of requirements as rapidly as possible, so that the test of its economic reasonability can be expedited. The following steps are therefore proposed:

Step 1, due date 25 July. Preliminary estimate of Soviet numerical requirements for offensive nuclear delivery systems by Working Group. This estimate to lean heavily on previous studies, and to arrive at a general idea of time periods by which the numerical requirements should be met. Pertinent existing studies are latest estimates on Soviet nuclear delivery systems through the period (e.g. Annex A of NIE 11-5-57 on most missiles; military sections of NIE 11-4-57 on tactical and naval aircraft, ground forces, submarines; SNIE 11-10-57 on ICBMs; SNIE 11-7-58 on long range bombers). Also pertinent are studies of target systems the USSR might wish to attack

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in the event of general war, including RAND studies and studies by AFCIN's Targets Office. These pertinent data should be assembled by appropriate members of the Working Group (ONE will assemble the NIE materials) in time for meetings to begin on or about 21 July.

Step 2, due 6 August. Preliminary scheduling of production and costing of deployment programs to meet requirements, primarily with respect to guided missiles, by ORR.

Step 3, due 15 August. Adjustment of programs by Working Group to prepare assumed mid-1962 Soviet strengths, in light of ORR's findings, availability of nuclear materials, possible requirements for limited war, etc.

Step 4, after 15 August. Consideration of these assumptions by ORR and adjustment of them by IAC representatives, in light of assumptions made by Air Defense Working Group and in relation to final version of NIE 11-5-58 and to contributions to the military section of NIE 11-4-58 submitted by the various agencies on 15 August.

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GIMie See Rep required to answer

Such ?i as - How many A/s look in on 1 A/cft

What type a/cft. Carries.

How many rods whole per a/cft etc.